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Constantin-Marius Apostoaie and Irina Bilan
Department of Finance, Money and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iaşi, Iaşi, Romania
ABSTRACT
Our study aims to quantitatively assess some of the determinants
of shadow banking dynamics in 11 European Union (E.U.) coun-
tries from Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.) over the period
2004–2017. Using panel data estimation techniques and a quar-
terly data set compiled from several publicly available data sour-
ces, we alternatively evaluate the impact of six macroeconomic
and financial variables on two dependent variables corresponding
to two different measures of the shadow banking sector, namely
the broad one (including all non-monetary financial institutions,
except insurance corporations and pension funds) and the narrow
one (excluding from the above one the investment funds, other
than money market funds [M.M.F.]). Our findings confirm that
shadow banking is sensitive to overall macroeconomic conditions
and that economic growth positively influences the expansion of
this segment of the financial sector. In addition, a higher demand
for funds from institutional investors, which also reveals a more
developed financial system, supports the expansion of the
shadow banking sector. Moreover, in a low interest rate environ-
ment, the search for yield makes investors turn to shadow banks,
while the development of the shadow banking sector is also
found to be complementary to the development of the rest of
the financial system, in particular, traditional banks.
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Shadow banking has become more significant in recent years, especially during and
after the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Although this less-regulated sector of the finan-
cial system continues to increase, and the studies and speeches around the topic
abound, there is yet no single, generally accepted definition and no suitable form of
measurement to accommodate the particularities of the sector in different countries.
The phenomenon has been nonetheless tackled by members of the academia as well
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as various international financial bodies, thus revealing the importance of the topic,
although most of the studies and reports focus on the cases of the U.S., the euro
area, and the U.K.
An overall survey of previous studies shows that advanced economies are the ones
researchers usually prefer to focus on, mainly because there is more data on the
shadow banking system in such countries. When looking at the shadow banking sys-
tem in these economies, one can easily notice that the credit intermediation process
comprises multiple steps, various partners connected by complex linkages, as well as
a peculiar and sophisticated relationship with the traditional banking system or other
components of the financial system. In the shadow banking systems of emerging mar-
ket and developing economies (as those in Central and Eastern Europe [C.E.E.]) the
processes and relationships are not so complex and diverse. Having shared a socialist
central planning system in the past, these particular countries are still making signifi-
cant efforts towards establishing a well-functioning financial system (Du, Li, & Wang,
2017), in this way depriving shadow banking of a context that could allow its institu-
tions and activities to flourish. In addition, the main entities that form the shadow
banking system in C.E.E. are simple and very easy to identify (Ghosh, Gonzalez del
Mazo, & €Otker-Robe, 2012). Therefore, the simplicity, recent development and lack
of data are some of the reasons why the C.E.E. countries have generally been
deprived of a thorough analysis of the phenomenon. Previous studies that refer to
these particular countries usually dedicate to them only a minor section in their
whole research.
To fill this gap, the current study aims to empirically assess how different variables
from the macroeconomic and financial environment influence the dynamics of the
shadow banking sector in the C.E.E. economies. Using panel data estimation techni-
ques on a quarterly data set compiled for a group of 11 New European Union (E.U.)
member states from C.E.E. and almost 13 years (2004Q2–2017Q1) we address the fol-
lowing research question: which are the macro determinants that significantly influ-
ence the expansion of shadow banking in C.E.E?
Based on previous evidences, we formulate and test the validity of the following
hypotheses: (1) the overall macroeconomic and global liquidity conditions have posi-
tive effects on the development of shadow banking (the procyclicality and high liquid-
ity hypotheses); (2) the search for yield makes investors turn to shadow banks and,
therefore, positively influences the development of this sector (the search for yield
hypothesis); (3) the development of the shadow banking system is complementary to
the development of the rest of the financial system (the complementarity hypothesis);
and (4) the higher the demand from institutional investors is, the more developed the
shadow banking system is (the institutional cash pool hypothesis).
Our article contributes to enhancing knowledge on shadow banks in two major
ways. Firstly, it provides both a theoretical and quantitative analysis of the phenom-
enon, whilst most pre-existing studies address only conceptual issues related to the
different facets of shadow banking (e.g. definition, measurement, dynamics, potential
triggers, and risks to the overall financial stability). Secondly, it offers a perspective
on shadow banking development and its drivers in the European countries, in par-
ticular in the 11 New EU Member States from C.E.E. This contribution may be very
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relevant since the bulk of existing literature focuses on the U.S., whereas the
European shadow banking system has quite different features compared to the later
(Jeffers & Plihon, 2016). Also, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical article
entirely dedicated to assessing the determinants of shadow banking’s dynamics in the
C.E.E. countries.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the develop-
ing approaches on shadow banking and overviews some of the main theoretical and
empirical findings on its determinants; Section 3 emphasises the main common char-
acteristics of C.E.E. countries and particularities of their shadow banking systems, in
this way providing a rationale for a separate analysis of the determinants of shadow
banking dynamics in this regional group; Section 4 presents the data and method-
ology employed in the manuscript; and Section 5 discusses the results. The last
Section of the article outlines the conclusions of the research.
2. Short literature survey on shadow banking and its determinants
When narrowing down the meaning of ‘shadow banking’ to a complex and peculiar
process of credit intermediation that takes place outside the regulated banking system,
one could trace this phenomenon decades ago. However, the concept was first
employed in this form more then ten years ago, in a speech held by the economist
Paul McCulley (2007) at the annual financial symposium hosted by the Kansas City
Federal Reserve Bank in Jackson Hole. Since then, the concept has been extensively
used by members of the academia and international financial institutions alike, to an
extent that it has acquired various and sometimes different definitions and interpreta-
tions. In fact, the ‘shadow economy’ term is not a firmly fixed concept in the litera-
ture, but subject to change and varying criteria (Bejakovic, 2015) and also known by
different names such as the hidden, grey, black, or informal economy (Hassan &
Schneider, 2016).
The necessity of having a clear, precise and commonly agreed-upon definition of
the concept is perfectly emphasised by Kabelik (2012, p. 4): ‘if regulation is to be
effective, it needs to be applied on accurately defined entities otherwise a potential
for regulatory arbitrage emerges. Therefore, the discussion about the definition mat-
ters.’ However, the job of defining the concept is not simple, because of the amorph-
ous character of the shadow banking itself, resulting from its high complexity,
interconnectedness with other financial as well as non-financial institutions, and het-
erogeneity across systems and countries).
Some of the studies that first focused on analysing shadow banking were per-
formed soon after McCulley’ s proposal, including here the ones of Adrian and Shin
(2009), Pozsar (2008), Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010), and Tucker
(2010). To date, much of the literature on shadow banking originates in the staff
reports developed by financial and monetary institutions, among which we include:
the Federal Reserve System or the Fed, the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the
Financial Stability Board (F.S.B.), and the European Systemic Risk Board (E.S.R.B.).
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After surveying the literature and analysing the multitude of definitions and spe-
cific approaches, some common characteristic can be agreed upon when ‘unpacking’
the concept of shadow banking, as pointed out below.
There is clearly a process of credit intermediation, associated with some forms of
maturity and liquidity transformation as well as leverage. Unlike traditional banking,
which implies a one-step transformation process (from deposits to loans), shadow
banking presumes a more complex intermediation process consisting in a series of
steps or ‘vertical slicing’; this specific process has been analysed in detail by Girasa
(2016, pp. 51–52). Bakk-Simon et al. (2012) also broadly define the shadow banking
system as all the activities related to credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity
transformation that happen outside the regular banking system (this definition being
accepted and used by the European Central Bank). An important driver in this regard
is considered to be the process of ‘financial innovation’, a topic about which the
standard economic theory has remarkably little to say (Guttmann, 2016).
There are no public safety nets (investors are not offered public guarantees if their
funds are mismanaged by shadow banking institutions) and no access to central bank
liquidity (shadow banks cannot request financial aid if they confront themselves with
funding problems). The lack of public support is very well highlighted in the defin-
ition provided by Pozsar et al. (2010): ‘shadow banks are financial intermediaries that
conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank
liquidity or public sector credit guarantees’. Nonetheless, although shadow banking
activity is removed from ‘official public-sector enhancements’, it typically receives
indirect or implicit enhancements according to Adrian and Ashcraft (2012).
The entities and activities in the ‘shadows’ are fragile and less regulated as opposite
to traditional banking institutions, hence the frequent encounter of the ‘outside’ term
in many definitions. ‘Less’ must not be confused with ‘lack’ because, although there
are fewer restrictions, this does not mean that entities from the shadow banking sys-
tem are entirely exempt from supervision and regulation; an example provided by
Broos, Carlier, Kakes, and Klaaijsen (2012) is the case of the shadow banking entities
that form part of a financial group that is itself subject to supervision. Examples of
definitions in this regard are the ones of Agresti (2016), Bernanke (2013), EC (2012),
FCIC (2010), FSB (2011), FSB (2012a), Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013).
The absence or trivial regulation associated with the lack or weak regulatory arbi-
trageurs in the shadow banking sector may drive the financial system towards a point
of systemic fragility (associated with high levels of systemic risk). A proper definition
of shadow banking in the view of the I.M.F. (2014a) should cover also the relevant
risk dimensions. In this regard, the institution identifies five specific risks, as follows:
(1) run risk – see Adrian (2014); (2) agency problems – see Adrian, Ashcraft and
Cetorelli (2013); (3) opacity and complexity – see Caballero and Simsek (2009); (4)
leverage and procyclicality – see (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); and (5) spillover
effects – see Pozsar et al. (2013).
One of the more widely recognised and accepted official (institutional) definitions
of shadow banking is the one provided by the F.S.B. (2012b) and includes the ‘entities
and activities outside the regular banking system’ that ‘raise: (1) systemic risk con-
cerns … ; and/or (2) regulatory arbitrage concerns’. Nonetheless, there are also efforts
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made at the European level to gauge the phenomenon. The E.S.R.B. proposes a dual
approach when investigating the potential financial stability risks of shadow banking-
type activities in the E.U. (ESRB, 2016), in the sense that it looks for shadow banking
threats that may rise either from financial institutions (‘entity-based approach’) or
from their activities (‘activity-based approach’). Yet one of the most useful approaches
in describing the shadow banking sector in Europe is provided by the European
Economic and Social Committee (E.E.S.C.), which highlights that shadow banking
activities occur both outside as well as partially inside the traditional banking system
(EESC, 2012).
With regard to the forces that drove the development of the shadow banking sec-
tor in recent decades, theories and hypotheses abound. Some explanations can be
traced in the more general framework of research on shadow economy. For instance,
F. Schneider shows that ‘the increase of the intensity of regulations … as well as the
increase of the tax and social security contribution burdens’ (Schneider, 2002) or ‘the
poor quality of institutions, the inefficient application of tax laws, and the bureau-
cracy and corruption’ (Davidescu & Schneider, 2017) are drivers of the shadow econ-
omy. In many of his works, Schneider uses an innovative measure to estimate the
dimension of the shadow economy of a specific country, namely the M.I.M.I.C. struc-
tural equation model. Based on this model he figures what variables can be consid-
ered drivers of a country’s shadow economy (Davidescu & Schneider, 2017; Hassan &
Schneider, 2016). Basically, the M.I.M.I.C. model explicitly considers multiple causes,
as well as multiple indicators of measuring the hidden economy. In our article, we
use panel data estimation techniques to connect multiple causes but with a sin-
gle indicator.
More potential drivers of shadow banking emerge from the survey of the previ-
ous literature in the field: tight banking regulation, economic growth, innovation,
high demand from institutional investors, the search for yield, or the overall devel-
opment of the financial sector – among others: Beck and Kotz (2016), Bouveret
(2011), Caballero (2010), Claessens et al. (2012), Duca (2016), Ghosh et al. (2012),
Goda, Lysandrou, and Stewart (2013), Goda and Lysandrou (2014), Gorton and
Metrick (2010), Helgadottir (2016), IMF (2014b), Lysandrou and Nesvetailova
(2015), Perotti (2013), and Pozsar et al. (2013). The bulk of these studies is tackled
within the content of the article and referred to when necessary. The inclination of
financial institutions to avoid taxes, accounting rules, or capital requirements (arbi-
trage) is also a major driver of shadow banking expansion (Adrian & Ashcraft,
2012). In fact, tax burden is, in general, the main factor influencing the develop-
ment of an unofficial economy or a ‘shadowy economy’ (Mikulic & Nagyszombaty,
2013). Moreover, some specific factors to each country also contributed to
this outcome.
The theoretical framework with regard to shadow banking is quite a complex net-
work of concepts and approaches. Arora and Zhang (2018) overview the existing the-
ories and dedicate a section in their work to the theoretical analysis. Nonetheless, for
a comprehensive literature on the theories around ‘guaranteed off-balance sheet’
development (a form of expressing shadow banking, especially in China) one can
look into the work of An and Yu (2018). The authors develop their ideas around the
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following theories: regulation avoidance theory; moral hazard theory; risk diversifica-
tion theory; market power theory; and scale economy theory.
Although theories explaining the reasons behind the emergence and development
of shadow banks over the last decade abound, little empirical effort has been done
until present days to assess the contribution of potential determinants. Among the
first empirical works approaching this issue is that of Acharya, Khandwala, and €Onc€u
(2013) who analyse the case of an emerging market economy (India) and document
that, in this particular case, banks see lending to non-deposit taking non-bank finan-
cial corporations as a substitute for direct lending in rural areas. Therefore, the insuf-
ficient bank branch network development in such areas could be considered an
important driver of shadow banks development, complementary to the traditional
banking system. Michael (2014) finds as well that shadow banking serves as a com-
plement to traditional banking in countries like South Africa or China, but in coun-
tries like Russia or Chile this unconventional funding system acts as a substitute.
Referring to the case of one single country, the U.S., Duca (2016) examines the
determinants of the credit supply from non-bank financial intermediaries to non-
financial corporations (N.F.C.), which is one of the main dimensions of shadow
banking activity. The author finds that, in the long-run, capital and reserve require-
ment arbitrage, together with information costs, are the main drives of shadow bank-
ing development. On the other hand, among the relevant short-term determinants
are included the economic outlook, deposit regulation, event risk and risk premium.
In addition, the shadow banking sector is found to be vulnerable to liquidity shocks
and pro-cyclical.
A more extensive panel data analysis was conducted by the I.M.F.’s staff (IMF,
2014b) on a sample that mostly comprises developed countries and spans more than
20 years (1990–2013). The study highlights that the tighter banking regulations, pos-
sibly combined with ample liquidity conditions, and the rising demand from institu-
tional investors are the main drivers of non-banking activities in the selected
economies. Also, the study confirms the hypothesis of complementarity between
shadow banks and the traditional banking system. Referring to a shorter period of
time (2002–2013), Kim (2016) confirms the same hypothesis for the G20 countries
and emphasises that the development of shadow banking is significantly influenced
by the demand from institutional investors.
For the euro area countries Malatesta, Masciantonio, and Zaghini (2016) show that
the loans granted by shadow banks to N.F.C.s (which could largely be considered a
measure of shadow banking activity) more than doubled during 1999–2014, and that
the macroeconomic variables used to control for domestic demand and supply condi-
tions (in particular, the real G.D.P. growth rate, inflation rate, and the term spread)
are by far the main determinants of this dynamics. In addition, the development of
institutional investors sector is also found to be positively correlated with the lending
activity of shadow banks.
Closer to our research, the study of Barbu, Boitan, and Cioaca (2016) evaluates the
macroeconomic determinants of shadow banking for a panel of 15 E.U. countries
(among which four C.E.E. economies) and a time span of about eight years
(2008Q1–2015Q3). Using the net value of the total assets of monetary funds as a
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proxy for shadow banking activity, the authors find that the dynamics of this sector
is negatively influenced by G.D.P. growth, short-term interest rates, liquidity, and
development of investment funds, and positively influenced by stock index dynamics
and long-term interest rates.
Also looking at the situation of the European countries, Jeffers and Plihon (2016)
run a principal component analysis to evaluate two major groups of variables, one
related to the main aspects of shadow banks’ activities and the other to the institu-
tional environment in which these entities operate. One interesting result of their
analysis is that nine C.E.E. countries form, based on the similarities in terms of the
two principal components identified, a cluster separate from the other European
countries, which could offer a rationale for our study.
The short overview of the literature on shadow banking and its determinants high-
lights that, despite the great interest for this topic, most studies are conducted for
developed countries, while emerging markets and developing economies are deprived
of a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. In particular, to our knowledge
there is no empirical study explicitly dedicated to C.E.E. countries, where the
shadow banking system has quite different features compared to other, more devel-
oped economies.
3. Characteristics of the Central and Eastern European countries and
particularities of their shadow banking systems
The focus of our article is on C.E.E., in particular on the 11 countries belonging to
this regional group that joined the E.U. so far, with five of them also in the eurozone.
Among these countries, according to the I.M.F. there are five emerging and develop-
ing economies (namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and six
advanced economies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and
Slovakia) (IMF, 2018). However, the classification by the level of economic develop-
ment varies depending on the classifying body. As Hampl (2018) argues, the post-
communist countries of Central Europe are typically classified as ‘developed’ by most
governmental or international institutions (such as the I.M.F., the World Bank, and
the E.B.R.D.), but as ‘emerging’ by various market institutions (F.T.S.E., M.S.C.I.,
Standard & Poor’s and J.P. Morgan, among others). Moreover, once a country enters
the euro area it is almost automatically treated as developed, which is sometimes con-
sidered to be confusing and raise doubts. This was the case of the majority of our
advanced C.E.E. countries, which progressively adopted euro in recent years (starting
with Slovenia, in 2007). Therefore, although some of our C.E.E. economies are con-
sidered to be developed, they present features that are more typical to the emerging
and developing countries from C.E.E. than to the advanced economies from Western
and Northern Europe. Nonetheless, nobody can deny that the differences between the
C.E.E. countries and the more developed E.U. economies tended to fade in time.
Despite some small differences in the degree of economic development, the C.E.E.
economies shared the socialist central planning system in the past. Having overcome
their background, these countries enrolled in a process of transition to market econ-
omy marked by country specific features and in various speeds. Once the transition
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process completed, the C.E.E. countries found themselves in similar stages of institu-
tional development, financial and macroeconomic reform, as well as banking sector
depth (IMF, 2010). In addition, the structure of the banking sector appears to be
similar in C.E.E. countries (Ramotowski, 2015) and they share the same ‘condition
of the financial markets’, making it easier to generate cross-country comparisons
(Du et al., 2017, p. 538). Among other characteristics that the C.E.E. countries
share, one can include: they are open economies, with average exports of about 80%
of G.D.P. in 2017 (with the exception of Croatia, Romania and Poland, which have
the largest domestic markets); they have already well-established EU legal rules and
standards; they have low wages, educated workforce, and relatively fast economic
growth, particularly in the pre-crisis period (Miklaszewska, Mikołajczyk, &
Pawłowska, 2012); and they have similar stock market characteristics (Karanovic &
Karanovic, 2018).
Long before their ascension in the E.U., the C.E.E. countries have been engaged
in complex processes of bank reforms, economic restructuring and privatisation.
After finally becoming a member of the E.U. family and before the 2008 financial
crisis, these countries experienced vigorous banking growth against a background of
rapid economic development. In addition, Andries (2011) shows that the E.U.
accession increased banking competition in the C.E.E. countries, which further led
to higher average efficiency of banks. As the global financial crisis emerged, this
dynamics was hampered and the traditional business model of banking intermedi-
ation (turning out to be the safest) was challenged. However, the resulting damages
were not so important compared to the leading industrialised nations, which were
more affected. Other common characteristics of the financial and banking sectors in
the C.E.E.s that are still valid after more than a decade from the outburst of the cri-
sis (turning these countries into a relatively homogeneous group) include
(Miklaszewska et al., 2012, pp. 14–16): they have ‘a relatively liberal financial sector
combined with large foreign ownership’; compared to the highly developed coun-
tries, banks in the C.E.E.s ‘remained small, following a traditional model of banking
intermediation, and not presenting a significant systemic risk’ (but profitable);
‘foreign currency borrowing constitutes a significant risk’ (with different foreign
exchange exposures across C.E.E. countries). Moreover, C.E.E. countries are host
markets for banks owned by large cross-border banking groups primarily from the
countries of the euro zone.
With regard to the shadow banking sector, the situation of C.E.E. countries is different
in many respects compared to the other, more developed E.U. countries and the U.S. The
data reflected in Figure 1 emphasise that prior to the crisis of 2008 shadow banking expe-
rienced a significant growth both in Europe and the U.S., fulfilling a very important role
in lending within the financial system in particular, and the economy as a whole. During
the period 2002–2007, the total assets of shadow banking institutions grew on average by
14.6% per year in the E.U. and 4.6% in the U.S. Although sharing a similar trend, the
C.E.E. countries registered a higher expansion of this segment of the financial system,
especially after 2004, clearly outpacing (in relative terms) the one in the E.U., the euro
area, and the U.S. The total volume of assets of shadow banking institutions in C.E.E.
countries grew on average by about 23% per year in 2002–2007. The steady expansion
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stopped during the crisis (the total assets of the shadow banking system amounted to
around 290 billion euros during 2007–2011), but the upward trend was resumed after-
wards and more sustainable this time.
Although the shadow banking system has grown markedly in C.E.E. countries, its
size remains relatively small, as also pointed out by Du et al. (2017) and Ghosh et al.
(2012). In 2016, the total assets of this segment of the financial sector amounted to
466 billion euros in our 11 C.E.E. countries, compared to about 32 trillion euros in
the euro area and 16 trillion in the U.S. Nonetheless, in C.E.E.s as in other E.U.
countries, the shadow banking system has grown in leverage and complexity, as well
as in terms of interconnectedness with the traditional banking sector (as also sug-
gested by Giron & Matas-Mir, 2017; Portes, 2018; and others) to an extent that now
it forms an integral part of the regular financial system.
Looking at the main structural components of the financial system in C.E.E.
countries in 2017 (Figure 2), one can notice a relatively similar distribution among
them by the total volume of assets (homogenous dispersion). The share of the assets
of shadow banking institutions in the total assets of the financial system in C.E.E.
countries is ranging from almost 6% to about 21%, with the exception of Hungary
where shadow banking institutions own more than half of the Hungarian financial
system (54.4%). Traditional banks own assets that usually exceed half of the finan-
cial system’s total volume of assets, with figures ranging between 48% and 70%
(once again, with the exception of Hungary). To sum up, Hungary excluded, all the
other C.E.E. countries have traditional banking systems that dominate national
financial systems in terms of total assets and a rather small but increasing shadow
banking system, followed by central banks and insurance corporations and pen-
sion funds.
By comparison, in the other (non-C.E.E.) E.U. countries the distribution of the
national financial system’s assets by structural components is rather heterogeneous.
Figure 1. Dynamics of shadow banking size (measured by the total non-consolidated assets of
O.F.I.s and I.F.s expressed in billion euros) in C.E.E.s, E.U., euro area, and the U.S. Note: Data have
not been available for the Czech Republic, in 2017. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data
from Eurostat (EC, 2018)
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Shadow banks are somehow insignificant in terms of assets in Greece (where they
cover only about 4% of the financial system), and spread over almost the entire finan-
cial system in Luxembourg (cumulating above 90% of the total assets). In countries
like Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and the Netherlands, the shadow banking system holds
more than half of the national financial system’s total assets, leaving far behind the
size of the other remaining components. On the other hand, in countries like
Germany, Spain, France and Italy, far more grater is the traditional banking sector,
represented by deposit takers (mainly commercial banks). Shadow banks hold here
below 20% of the financial system’s total assets.
Another particularity of the shadow banking system in C.E.E. is that the main
entities forming it are very easy to identify, in most of the cases being represented by
finance companies (including micro-financing institutions), leasing and factoring
companies, investment and equity funds, insurance companies, pawn shops, and
underground entities (Ghosh et al., 2012). In Romania, for instance, the other finan-
cial institutions that form the shadow banking system perform activities such as: pro-
vide consumer credits and mortgage/real estate loans, provide microcredits, issuance
of guarantees, factoring and financial leasing, financing of commercial transactions,
discounting activities (NBR, 2018). Referring to the shadow banking system in emerg-
ing market and developing economies (including C.E.E.s), Ghosh et al. (2012) also
point out that ‘finance, leasing, and factoring companies; investment and equity
funds; insurance companies; pawn shops; and underground entities’ comprise the
main participants in the shadow banking system (Ghosh et al., 2012, p. 2). Moreover,
they argue that it ‘is less about long, complex, opaque chains of intermediation and
more about being weakly regulated or falling outside the regulatory sphere altogether’
(Ghosh et al., 2012, pp. 3–4).
Figure 2. Main structural components of the financial system in C.E.E.s and other E.U. countries (%
of the total assets of the financial system). Notes: Data are for 2017, with the exception of the
Czech Republic for which the latest data available were for 2016; the U.K. was excluded due to the
lack of disaggregated data for central banks and monetary financial institutions other than central
banks. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Eurostat (EC, 2018)
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4. Data and methodology
Our empirical study examines the determinants of the dynamics of shadow banking for
a panel of 11 E.U. member states from C.E.E., namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Since comparable data (resulting from international/European data-collecting initia-
tives) on the assets of the financial sector, disaggregated by sub-sectors to a level that
enables to approximate shadow banking’s dimension, are quite scarce in the case of
our countries, generally being available for no more than 13 years and in some cases
even less, we decided to run the regression analysis on quarterly data. This allowed us
to expand the time dimension of our panel to a maximum of 52 observations per
country, corresponding to the period 2004Q2–2017Q1, although common observations
for all 11 countries have been available only since 2012Q4. Whilst the main data
source, used for our shadow banking variables, is represented by Eurostat, some other
international and European databases have been used as well, such as I.M.F.’s
International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2017a) and Monetary and Financial Statistics
database (IMF, 2017b), and E.C.B.’s Statistical Data Warehouse database (ECB, 2018)
(see Appendix 1 for more details on data sources and data availability).
The model is a linear regression model linking indicators that measure the growth
of the shadow banking sector in our sample countries with several potential macro-
economic and financial determinants, as depicted by Equation (1).
SDBi;t ¼ bjDETj;i;t þ ui;t (1)
where:
 i refers to the country (i¼ 1–11);
 t refers to time periods (quarters) (t¼ 1–52);
 SDB is the dependent variable (a measure of shadow banking growth);
 DETj is a vector of independent variables (potential determinants of shadow bank-
ing growth);
 bj are the coefficients of the independent variables;
 u(i,t) are the idiosyncratic (observation-specific) errors.
In choosing between the several methods available for estimating panel linear
regression models, we firstly checked whether we should account for unobservable, or
heterogeneity effects, which may cause the error term to be correlated with some of
the considered regressors. After running a random effects (R.E.) regression, we per-
formed the Lagrange multiplier (L.M.) test for R.E.s, allowing us to decide between
the pooled O.L.S. and R.E. regressions. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that
the variance of the unobserved fixed effects (F.E.) is not statistically different from
zero at the significance level of 10%, and concluded that the R.E. model is not the
most appropriate. We also ran the Hausman test, widely used in the literature to
choose between the F.E. and R.E. regressions. The null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated
by the consistent F.E. estimator was not rejected either, leading us to the conclusion
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that the R.E. estimation is to be preferred. This is consistent with the observation
that in the case of panels with large time dimension (T) and small cross-sectional
dimension (N) (as is the case of our data set where T¼ 52 and N¼ 11) there is likely
to be insignificant difference in the values of the parameters estimated by the F.E.
and R.E. estimation techniques (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 606).
All these arguments confirm that our group of countries, consisting of C econo-
mies that shared a similar pattern of economic and financial development during the
last decades, can be considered quite homogenous in terms of the factors that affect
shadow banking (as also pointed out by Jeffers & Plihon, 2016). Therefore, the pooled
O.L.S. estimation technique, which does not explicitly take heterogeneity into account,
is used in most of our estimations. However, since the F.E. method is widely used in
the literature when investigating the determinants of shadow banking, we decided to
also report the results of the fixed-effects estimation for our full model.
Besides the time-invariant entity (country) effects, we also checked the need to
control for time effects. In this respect, we introduced 13 dummy variables (for the
14 years of our time span, to avoid falling into the dummy-variable trap) in the right
hand-side of Equation (1), along with the independent variables considered to poten-
tially explain the dynamics of shadow banking. Alternatively, 51 dummy variables for
each of the quarters of our time dimension have also been considered, although this
approach presents the disadvantage of consuming a larger number of degrees of free-
dom. After running the dummy variable models, we tested the hypothesis that the
coefficients of the categorical variables are jointly equal to zero. The null was rejected
at a significance level of 5% in all cases, leading to the conclusion that time effects
are needed.
To avoid high multicollinearity issues, we checked the correlations across the inde-
pendent variables. All correlation coefficients were found to be below the threshold of
0.8, level suggested as a rule of thumb in the literature (Gujarati & Porter, 2009) (see
Appendix 2). We also computed the variance inflation factors (V.I.F.s), and they
resulted to be well below 5.0 (mean VIF of 2.53 in our full model with time-quar-
ter effects).
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, although the OLS estimators are unbiased
and consistent, they are not efficient and the standard errors are inconsistent.
Therefore, we had to check if the variance of the residuals is constant and ran the
White general test for heteroskedasticity. One shortcoming of this test is that it does
not work well and is less powerful when many explanatory variables are included,
although it allows testing more types of heteroskedasticity (including the non-linear
ones). Therefore, we could not use it for the models with time (in particular, quarter)
dummy variables. Instead, the relative simpler Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test
was used in these cases. When the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is
homogenous was rejected, Huber/White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
were reported. Also, to test for serial correlation, we ran the Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel data models, and we failed to reject the null hypothesis of no
first order autocorrelation at the 5% level of significance.
One difficult task when specifying the econometric model and selecting the varia-
bles was to choose the appropriate measure of shadow banking, which could best
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capture the true dimensions of this sector in our group of countries. From this point
of view, different alternatives of measurement have been advanced in theory and
practice, designed to accommodate the increasing complexity of shadow banking.
One widely employed measure consists in using the aggregated financial assets of
other financial intermediaries (O.F.I.s) as an instrument to measure shadow banking
(an ‘entity-based’ approach). O.F.I.s include all non-bank financial corporations and
quasi corporations that are engaged mainly in financial intermediation and provide
primarily long-term funding. In general terms, here are not included central banks,
banks (all deposit-taking corporations), insurance corporations, pension funds, public
financial institutions, and financial auxiliaries. This measure was initially adopted by
the F.S.B., which also made a distinction between a broader approach and a narrower
one, the later filtering out non-bank financial activities that have no direct relation to
credit intermediation (e.g. equity investment funds) or that are already prudentially
consolidated into banking groups (FSB, 2014, 2015).
Nonetheless, this measure is often contested because it accounts for entities that
are not engaged in shadow banking activities, therefore overstating the true dimen-
sions of shadow banking in many countries. To remedy this deficiency, ‘activity-
based’ approaches on measuring shadow banking have been advanced. The F.S.B. pro-
posed a new ‘economic-function-based’ measure of shadow banking, classifying non-
bank financial institutions in accordance with five economic functions that involve
non-bank credit intermediation with some risks to financial stability (FSB, 2015).
Although activity-based approaches are generally considered to be more accurate,
it is not yet possible to use these measures of shadow banking for the New E.U.
member states from C.E.E., because of limited data availability. In fact, the most com-
plete financial data source for this regional group is represented by Eurostat, which
only reports data on the assets and liabilities of the financial sector, disaggregated by
sub-sectors. Because of this limitation, the entity-based approach in measuring
shadow banking was adopted.
Moreover, based on the F.S.B.’s distinction between the broad and the narrow
approaches and the structure of available data for the C.E.E. countries, two alternative
definitions of shadow banking institutions have been considered. The broad one
includes all non-monetary financial institutions, except insurance corporations and
pension funds. Therefore, from the overall financial sector the following institutions
are excluded: monetary and financial institutions (central banks, deposit-taking cor-
porations, and money market funds [M.M.F.]), public financial institutions, insurance
corporations, and pension funds. However, between this definition and the F.S.B.’s
broader definition of shadow banking there are some minor differences. In particular,
M.M.F.s) are excluded from our approach, due to the lack of quarterly data for the
assets of monetary and financial institutions disaggregated by sub-sector. However,
this is not a major problem since M.M.F.s are less developed in C.E.E. Moreover, the
same approach is suggested by Bakk-Simon et al. (2012) as appropriate for the euro
area countries, since data can be easily retrieved from the Eurosystem’s financial
accounts. Besides excluding entities like M.M.F.s that are for sure engaged in shadow
banking activities, another shortcoming of the above definition is that it includes
intermediaries for which such a classification is sometimes considered to be
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questionable in the literature, like regulated investment funds (Malatesta et al., 2016).
Therefore, we also took into account a second approach on shadow banking that
excludes non-M.M.F. investment funds, corresponding to the F.S.B.’s narrower defin-
ition. In this way we hope to capture those activities that are closer to the banking
sector, and identify if there is a complementarity with this regulated area of the finan-
cial system.
Therefore, the dynamics of the shadow banking sector is captured in our model by
two dependent variables that measure the quarterly growth rate of the aggregated
assets of shadow banking, both in the narrow (the SDB_NARROW variable) and
broad (the SDB_BROAD variable) approach (see Table 1 for further explanations and
Appendix 3 for the descriptive statistics).
Based on previous findings, six macroeconomic and financial variables were con-
sidered as potential determinants of shadow banking dynamics in our sample coun-
tries. Their description and expected effects are shortly presented in Table 1.
One macroeconomic variable – the real G.D.P. growth rate (GDP) – was included
to capture the overall effects of the domestic supply and demand conditions. In peri-
ods of fast economic growth, traditional banks may not be able to cope with the high
Table 1. Variables description.
Variable Explanation Previous empirical findings Expected sign
Dependent variables
SDB_BROAD Growth rate of total financial assets of other financial institutions (insurance companies
and pension funds non-included) (% change on previous period)
SDB_NARROW Growth rate of total financial assets of other financial institutions (insurance companies
and pension funds non-included), except investment funds (% change on previous period)
Independent variables
GDP Real GDP growth rate, seasonally
adjusted (% change on
previous period)
(þ) Malatesta et al. (2016), IMF
(2014b) and Kim (2016)
(–) Barbu et al. (2016) and Hodula
et al. (2017)
(þ)
INSTIT_INVEST Growth rate of total financial assets
of insurance corporations and
pension funds (% change on
previous period)
(þ) Malatesta et al. (2016), IMF
(2014b) and Kim (2016)
(–) Barbu et al. (2016)
(þ)
TSPREAD Term spread – the difference
between long-term interest rates
(10 years maturity, interests rate
for convergence purposes) and
money market interest rates (three
months maturity, deposit
liabilities) (% per annum)
(–) Malatesta et al. (2016), IMF
(2014b) (significant only after
2008), Kim (2016) and Hodula
et al. (2017)
(–)
MM_RATE Money market rate (% per annum) (þ) Malatesta et al. (2016)
(–) IMF (2014b) (significant only
after 2008); Barbu et al. (2016)
and Hodula et al. (2017)
(–)
MFI Growth rate of total assets reported
by M.F.I.s (monetary and financial
institutions), excluding E.S.C.B.
(European System of Central
Banks (% change on
previous period)
(þ) IMF (2014b); Kim (2016);
Hodula et al. (2017)
(þ)
LIQUIDITY Growth rate of total reserves,
excluding gold (% change on
previous period)
(þ) IMF (2014b)
(–) Barbu et al. (2016)
(þ)
Note: signifies that the variables were found to have statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level
of confidence.
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demand for credit from households and nonfinancial corporations, due to their inher-
ent rigidity (such as legal constraints, high costs) (IMF, 2014b). Therefore, since one of
the shadow banks’ functions is to provide alternative funding to the real economy, we
would expect that, as macroeconomic conditions improve and the demand for money
(credit) increases, shadow banking activity expands. On the other hand, in periods of
economic distress shadow banks tend to be considered less reliable compared to trad-
itional banks due to their lack of appropriate safety nets, which may explain why they
are very vulnerable to changes in the economic outlook. In line with these explanations,
we expect for a positive and significant impact of the G.D.P. growth rate on our two
dependent variables, which is consistent with the shadow banking procyclicality
hypothesis mentioned by Adrian and Shin (2009) and empirically evidenced by Duca
(2016), Hodula, Machacek, and Melecky (2017), and Malatesta et al. (2016).
As proxy for global liquidity conditions we use the growth rate of total reserves,
excluding gold (LIQUIDITY). Besides being procyclical, the shadow banking sector is
said to be very vulnerable to liquidity shocks, as shown by Adrian and Shin (2009,
Adrian & Shin, 2010), Duca (2016) and Gorton and Metrick (2012). Liquidity drops lead
to the decrease of the total value of shadow banks’ assets, whilst in a high liquidity envir-
onment this segment of the financial sector flourishes. Therefore, we expect the total
liquidity of the economy to be positively associated with our two determined variables.
Two financial variables, the term spread (TSPREAD) computed as difference
between risk-free long-term and short-term interest rates, and the money market rate
(MMR) are considered as potential determinants of the dynamics of shadow banking,
in line with the search for yield hypothesis. In a low interest rate environment, the
search for higher yield could make investors turn to shadow banks, so a decrease of
these variables should positively influence our dependent variables, as previously evi-
denced by the I.M.F. (2014b).
The hypothesis of complementarity between the development of shadow banking and
of the rest of the financial system is captured in our study by the two remaining explica-
tive variables. The growth rate of the total assets of monetary and financial institutions
excluding central banks (MFI) is intended to emphasise potential complementarities
between shadow banks and traditional banks, which are at the core of the financial sys-
tem in C.E.E. countries. On the same path of reasoning, the growth rate of the total
assets of insurance corporations and pension funds (INSTIT_INVEST) is intended to
capture the complementarities between the development of institutional investors and
non-bank financial intermediaries, while also emphasising, on the demand-side, the con-
sequences of an increased demand for shadow banking products from this segment of
the financial sector (the institutional cash pool hypothesis). We expect both of these var-
iables to be positively associated with the dynamics of the shadow banking sector, in
agreement with the findings of the I.M.F. (2014b) and Malatesta et al. (2016).
5. Results and discussions
In our research approach we firstly performed univariate regression analyses between
the broad measure of shadow banking and each of the explanatory variables included
in the full model. The results are presented in Table 2, column (1). With the
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exception of the money market rate, all the explanatory variables have the right sign
(in accordance with other studies and in line with our expectations) and are all statis-
tically significant. This provides evidence that the dynamics of the shadow baking sec-
tor (in terms of its assets) has been positively influenced, among others, by the
developments in the institutional investor sector, banking sector, money market rate,
as well as the general liquidity and economic conditions. Only the term spread, which
captures the search for yield effect, seems to have a downward pressure on the
shadow banking sector.
Further on, the study continues with the establishment of a core model that has
already been confirmed by the existing literature and that we could further use as
a benchmark for other models. Model (2) reveals that the variables capturing the
overall macroeconomic conditions, the institutional cash pools and financial devel-
opment, as well as the search for yield have jointly a statistically significant impact
on the dynamics of the shadow banking sector in C.E.E.s. Although the value of
the adjusted R-squared (0.1366) is quite small, it is nonetheless comparable with
the results of other representative studies (An & Yu, 2018; Du et al., 2017;
IMF, 2014b).
Shadow banking results to be sensitive to overall macroeconomic conditions, eco-
nomic growth positively influencing the expansion of this segment of the financial
sector. This may be because the main function of the shadow banking sector in the
C.E.E. countries is, due to its particular structure (consisting mainly of leasing and
factoring companies, credit unions, cooperative banks, microfinance companies, and
pawn shops), that of providing alternative funding to the economy, as pointed out by
Ghosh et al. (2012). As Du et al. (2017) also mention in their work, in general in
C.E.E. countries many credit institutions focus more on households (i.e., mortgage
loans) than on enterprises. Moreover, within the bank operations performed for
enterprises, a significant number is devoted to processing payments, instead of credit
provision. Therefore, as many companies are unobserved or underserved by the for-
mal financial system (Haselmann, Wachtel, & Sobott, 2016), they are searching for
finances outside their traditional suppliers.
Also, the institutional cash pools and search for yield hypotheses are confirmed. A
higher demand from institutional investors, also revealing a more developed financial
system, supports the expansion of the shadow banking sector, while term spread has
reversed effects (given the negative sign).
By introducing into the model the money market rate – see model (3) – the total
number of observations decreases, due to low data availability, but the explanatory
power of the model increases to 24%. Also, the newly introduced variable results to
have the right (negative) sign. Therefore, it is confirmed our hypothesis that lower
yields in the financial markets motivate investors to look for more attractive returns
in riskier places, as in the shadow banking sector. As also identified by Hodula et al.
(2017) in their research on the Spanish case, decreasing interest rates boost the search
for yield motive from the traditional banking sector, which is looking for more profit-
able sources of income and often engages in securitisation activities. But in contrast
to the findings of Hodula et al. (2017) or the I.M.F. (2014a), our coefficients are stat-
istically significant in almost all the models.
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Models (4) to (8) add variables capturing the development of the banking sector
and overall financial liquidity. Whilst model (4) reflects the results of a simple pooled
O.L.S. regression, country F.E.s and time (quarterly and yearly) effects have alterna-
tively been considered in the subsequent models. Although the latter approach
increases the explanatory power of our models (reflected by an increase in the
adjusted R-squared with up to 25%), some important independent variables (in par-
ticular, the one capturing the size of the traditional banking sector) lose their statis-
tical significance in the process. Despite the lack of significance, all the newly
introduced variables reveal the expected signs, partially supporting the validity of
our hypotheses.
The values and signs of the coefficients associated with the banking sector vari-
able prove, in models (4) and (5), that the development of this particular segment
of the financial system goes hand in hand with non-traditional (shadow) banking.
Therefore, there is strong evidence that the hypothesis of complementarity
between the two sectors holds, supporting the view that the market-based finance
can progress together with traditional banking. This could also point to the exist-
ence of some common roots for both processes (such as the development of I.T.C.
technologies, the European integration, financial innovation), resulting in a gener-
alised development of the financial system. In addition, it is possible that some
common factors, like the international economic and financial crisis or the
European debt crisis, equally affected the dynamics of both sectors in our sample
countries. This is confirmed when time dummy variables are included in the
model and the coefficients of the banking sector variable result to lose their
strength and statistical significance. Although the coefficients of the categorical
variables have not been reported in Table 2 for reasons of space, our analysis
revealed that they were statistically relevant at the 5% level of significance for the
years of crisis (2008–2010).
As we take into consideration the narrower measure of the shadow banking
sector (Table 3), our previous results with regard to the sign and statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficients are roughly confirmed. However, the overall explanatory
power of the models decreases, the maximum value of the adjusted R-squared
being of just 0.31, in model (7). One possible reason may be that some of our
explanatory variables (like the one capturing the demand for investment products
from insurance companies and pension funds) are very important determinants
for the development of one particular segment of the shadow banking sector,
namely investment funds, intentionally excluded in our narrower approach. Some
proof, besides theoretical arguments, lie in the coefficients of the variable captur-
ing the dimensions of the institutional investors sector. The ones reported in
Table 3 are much smaller than the ones in Table 2, in all models. Moreover, while
for some variables (like GDP) the coefficients do not change by much, in other
cases, of variables more strongly related to bank-based finance (as TSPREAD,
MMR, and MFI), their value increases in all cases. Altogether, the results of the
regressions on the narrower shadow banking measure prove that this approach
more adequately captures the potential complementarities with the traditional
banking sector.
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6. Conclusion
The article provided some glimpses into a continuously evolving and intriguing phe-
nomena that is being observed worldwide but has only in recent years speed up its
growing process in C.E.E. countries, that is shadow banking. More specifically, our
research aimed to empirically assess the macro determinants of its dynamics for a panel
of 11 E.U. countries from this region, using quarterly data spanning 2004–2017.
Broadly speaking, we noticed an important increase in the shadow banking sector
in 2004 in C.E.E. countries, clearly outpacing the growth rate in the euro area.
During the recent financial crisis, the total volume of assets of the shadow banking
institutions was rather stable in the region, and it resumed its upward trend after-
wards. One question arises from this dynamics: what where the factors that deter-
mined the shadow banking system to develop at a greater pace compared to the
traditional banking sector in the C.E.E. countries?
The empirical analysis revealed that the shadow banking sector is quite sensitive to
overall macroeconomic conditions in C.E.E.s, economic growth positively and signifi-
cantly influencing the expansion of this segment of the financial sector. This gives us
strong arguments to confirm the hypothesis of shadow banking procyclicality for our
group of countries. Moreover, because of the positive values of the coefficients of the
variable used to account for global liquidity conditions, we can safely presume that the
shadow banking sector is very susceptible to runs and liquidity shortages. The institu-
tional cash pools and search for yield hypotheses are also confirmed, showing that in a
low interest rate environment like the one following the financial crisis in C.E.E.s, the
search for higher yield makes investors turn to shadow banking products. Moreover, the
hypothesis of complementarity between the development of shadow banking and of the
rest of the financial system is confirmed as well, probably with stronger evidence given
the nature of the bank-based economy in C.E.E. countries. In these economies, shadow
banks provide alternative funding where traditional banking is not able to do so.
One shortcoming of our analysis with regard to the selected explicative variables is
that it fails to catch the effects of regulatory arbitrage opportunities on the develop-
ment of bank-like activities outside the regulated banking system. This is considered
to be the primary determinant of shadow banking by authors such as Harris, Opp,
and Opp (2014), Ordonez (2013) and Plantin (2015). The main explanation comes
from the lack of data (and, in particular, quarterly data) on the variables that could
proxy the changes in the regulatory environment in our C.E.E. countries. In addition,
the changes in the regulatory environment are evidenced to affect shadow banking
over the long-term (Duca, 2016). Therefore, an analysis including such variables
should be conducted on long data series, which are not available, unfortunately, for
our sample countries.
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Appendix 1. Data sources and availability
Appendix 2. Correlation matrix
Variable Data source Data availability
Dependent variables
SDB_BROAD European Commission, Eurostat
(Financial balance sheets, code
S125_S126_S127 þ code S124)







SDB_NARROW European Commission, Eurostat
(Financial balance sheets, code
S125_S126_S127)








GDP IMF, International Financial Statistics 2004Q2–2017Q1







TSPREAD ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse 2004Q2–2017Q1











LIQUIDITY IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics 2004Q2–2017Q1
SDB_BROAD SDB_NARROW GDP INSTIT_INVEST TSPREAD MM_RATE MFI LIQUIDITY
SDB_BROAD 1.0000
SDB_NARROW 0.8542 1.0000
GDP 0.3547 0.3025 1.0000
INSTIT_INVEST 0.3048 0.2474 0.2090 1.0000
TSPREAD –0.3310 –0.3513 –0.1326 –0.2313 1.0000
MM_RATE 0.1609 0.1719 0.0956 0.2471 –0.6708 1.0000
MFI 0.3784 0.3704 0.4046 0.2853 –0.3578 0.2878 1.0000
LIQUIDITY 0.1090 0.1144 0.0733 –0.0051 –0.0429 –0.0197 0.1899 1.0000
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SDB_BROAD 418 2.946039 7.663353 –21.88652 50.14164
SDB_NARROW 418 2.622164 8.434433 –25.606 54.95159
GDP 572 1.439742 2.396132 –12.17875 12.13753
INSTIT_INVEST 418 3.211402 4.866932 –41.75385 21.0696
TSPREAD 583 1.135172 2.894493 –20.25333 10.4
MM_RATE 447 2.867496 3.02268 –.3718333 21.13333
MFI 518 2.030049 4.075972 –15.57954 21.19705
LIQUIDITY 572 2.718395 23.90599 –98.64458 442.5556
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